Laserfiche WebLink
N <br />enough; (6) there is no easily accessible parking; (7) it <br />is necessary to walk ".35 miles" to get to an area where <br />cooking is permitted; and (8) there is no place for <br />residents to charge cell phones.8 The uncertainty <br />around claims of this sort is putting insurmountable <br />pressure on cities and counties to settle, rather than <br />expose themselves to costly litigation and the threat of <br />damages under Section 1983. See, e.g., Notice of Filing <br />Settlement of Class Action, Orange Cty. Catholic <br />Worker u. Orange Cty., et al., No. 8:18-cv-00155, Dkt. <br />318 (C.D. Cal., July 23, 2019). <br />Finally, yet another category of questions concerns <br />whether, and under what circumstances, a shelter's <br />policies can render it unavailable for a given homeless <br />individual. For example, many shelters have a <br />religious orientation. See, e.g., Pet.App. 37a-39a. Is <br />such a shelter unavailable to an individual who <br />advances a religious objection? The panel suggested <br />that "coerc[ing] an individual to attend religion -based <br />treatment" "via the threat of prosecution" would <br />violate the Establishment Clause. Pet.App. 47a. If <br />that position is correct, it would potentially eliminate <br />all religious shelters from the calculus required by the <br />decision below. Moreover, it would also be necessary <br />to ask what other constitutional rights may render <br />large categories of shelters unavailable. For example, <br />could "coerc[ing]" an individual to stay at a shelter <br />that requires residents to surrender certain dangerous <br />items constitute a Fourth Amendment violation (or a <br />8 Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Application for a <br />Temporary Restraining Order at 5, 15-18, Housing Is a Human <br />Right Orange Cty. et al. u. Cty. of Orange et al., No. 8:19-cv-00388, <br />Dkt. 69-1 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2019). <br />