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13 <br />carefully. 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, <br />505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). Jones suggested that <br />the underlying question was whether an individual's <br />"past volitional acts" were "sufficiently proximate to <br />the conduct at issue ... for the imposition of penal <br />sanctions to be permissible." Id. at 1137. <br />Under that framework, the issue in the examples <br />above would be whether the lack of available shelter is <br />so tightly linked to an individual's prior volitional acts <br />that the individual should be viewed as sleeping on the <br />streets voluntarily, even if no shelter is available to <br />her at that precise moment. But it is not clear whether <br />the decision below leaves room even for that modest <br />qualification. And even if it did, the exception would <br />not be administrable. There is no practical way for city <br />officials making street -level enforcement decisions to <br />conduct an all -things -considered evaluation of which <br />"past volitional acts" (if any) deprived a particular <br />homeless person of access to shelter. <br />II. How SHOULD SHELTER AVAILABILITY BE <br />MEASURED? <br />A. It Is Prohibitively Difficult To Measure the <br />Number of Homeless Individuals <br />The opinion below declares that public sleeping <br />ordinances cannot be enforced "so long as there is a <br />greater number of homeless individuals in a <br />jurisdiction than the number of available beds in <br />shelters." Pet.App. 62a (quotation marks & <br />alterations omitted). Thus, to determine whether it <br />may enforce its ordinances, a local government must <br />determine how many homeless individuals are within <br />its jurisdiction. Obtaining that information, however, <br />is virtually impossible. <br />