Laserfiche WebLink
17 <br />many cities will be forced to simply abandon them —as <br />some have already begun to do. Pet.App. 17a-19a (M. <br />Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). <br />The consequences for public safety and health will be <br />as predictable as they are dire. <br />III. WHAT OTHER LAWS WILL BE AFFECTED? <br />A. The expansive logic of the decision below also <br />threatens a host of other public health and safety laws. <br />To appreciate the panel opinion's scope, it is helpful to <br />compare it with its vacated predecessor, Jones. <br />The Jones panel made at least some effort to cabin <br />its opinion. In particular, it identified a safe harbor <br />for laws which required, as an element, "some conduct" <br />beyond simply sitting, lying, or sleeping in the streets. <br />444 F.3d at 1123-24. Jones made clear that such laws <br />were permissible because they did not "criminaliz[e] <br />the status of homelessness." Id. at 1123. The decision <br />below, however, contains no such assurances. <br />One category of laws falling within the Jones safe <br />harbor are "time, place, and manner" laws—e.g., <br />ordinances that apply only during limited hours, or <br />prohibit sleeping "in clearly defined and limited zones," <br />or prohibit "obstruct[ing] pedestrian or vehicular <br />traffic." Id. at 1123. The opinion below, by contrast, <br />says only that such statutes "might well be <br />constitutionally permissible." Pet.App. 63a n.8 <br />(emphasis added). That is hardly reassuring. <br />Indeed, as noted above, the opinion below could be <br />read as suggesting that cities must provide indoor <br />shelter before enforcing their ordinances. Under that <br />logic, would an ordinance restricting public sleeping in <br />certain designated areas be construed as an attempt <br />to, in effect, turn the rest of the city into an inadequate <br />