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DOWDALL LAW OFFICES <br />A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION <br />ATTO R N EYS AT LAW <br />City Council of the City of Santa Ana <br />City of Santa Ana <br />September 16, 2021 <br />Page 26 <br />The New Motor Vehicle Board ("NMVB") violated due process based on this most basic <br />of fundamental pillars of a fair and impartial judge. In summary, the NMVB was composed of <br />competing interests with an imbalanced number of members of each side. The court held that the <br />institutional imbalance constituted a violation of due process. Likewise, the institutional <br />imbalance between mobilehome park owners or other landlords and tenants constitutes an <br />institutional imbalance which most clearly, indeed blatantly, violates due process of law. The <br />court held that the car dealers are biased not solely because they are members of the dealer -class <br />of litigants and are thus per se constitutionally ineligible to sit on the Board. What the court held <br />is that the combination of (1) the mandated dealer -Board members, (2) the lack of any <br />counterbalance in mandated manufacturer members, (3) the nature of the adversaries in all cases <br />(dealers v. manufacturers), and (4) the nature of the controversy in all cases (dispute between <br />dealer and manufacturer) deprives a manufacturer -litigant of procedural due process, because the <br />state does not furnish an impartial tribunal (American Motors Sales Corp. v. NMVB (1977) 69 <br />Cal.App.3d 983, 993). <br />The same failure to comport with due process lies in the instant case. The tenant <br />members of the commission are mandated; there must be an equal number of competing <br />landlords to push the size of the rent board to nine members. <br />Historically, the NMVB was established in 1973 and given jurisdiction to resolve <br />controversies between new car dealers and manufacturers, pursuant to Vehicle Code § 3060, <br />which provides that a new car franchisor shall not "terminate or refuse to continue any existing <br />franchise" without reasons constituting, "good cause." Of critical import was that the Legislature <br />required that four of its nine members shall be new car dealers. Vehicle Code § 3001. See <br />generally, Chevrolet Motor Division v. NMVB (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 533, 536 [194 Cal.Rptr. <br />270], cert. den., 465 U.S. 1102 [80 L.Ed.2d 129, 104 S.Ct. 1597, 15981.] The purpose of the <br />legislation was, inter alia, to protect dealers. <br />The reasons why dealers were included on the board was to keep a check on the <br />manufacturers. Thus, the dealers were present to watchdog or check the practices of the <br />manufacturers, not just those manufacturers with whom there were actual disputes. Togas v. <br />American Honda Motor Co. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 506, n.7. <br />[Vehicle Code] §3000 provides that' [there is in the Department of Motor Vehicles a New <br />Motor Vehicle Board, which consists of nine members.' 31 "Section 1, 39, of Stats. 1973, c. 996, <br />p. 1964, provided: ¶ 'Section 1. The Legislature finds and declares that the distribution and sale <br />of new motor vehicles in the State of California vitally affects the general economy of the state <br />and the public welfare and that in order to promote the public welfare and in the exercise of its <br />police power, it is necessary to regulate and to license vehicle dealers, manufacturers, <br />manufacturer branches, distributors, distributor branches, and representatives of vehicle <br />manufacturers and distributors doing business in California in order to avoid undue control of the <br />independent new motor vehicle dealer by the vehicle manufacturer or distributor and to insure <br />that dealers fulfill their obligations under their franchises and provide adequate and sufficient <br />-26- <br />