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DOWDALL LAW OFFICES <br />A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION <br />ATTO R N EYS AT LAW <br />City Council of the City of Santa Ana <br />City of Santa Ana <br />September 16, 2021 <br />Page 41 <br />prepayment subject to HUD approval, which would be granted "`only if prepayment would not <br />materially increase economic hardship for current tenants."' Id. <br />Cienega Gardens explicitly addresses the question of whether adopting this legislation <br />`went too far,' resulting in a "Penn Central" regulatory taking, by "show[ing] that the <br />government has improperly shifted a public burden to a small class of private parties. Id. at <br />1328, quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). The Ninth Circuit reversed <br />the decision of the trial court "because the conclusion that the housing program participants did <br />not suffer a compensable taking was incorrect." Id. The Court applied the three factor Penn <br />Central analysis to assess the taking claim. Id at 1337. In finding a taking, the Ninth Circuit <br />focused on the character of the government action. Id. <br />The Cienega Gardens court noted that the regulation curtailed the right of the property <br />owners to exclude low rent tenants from their property, "by requiring Owners to continue to rent <br />their properties at below market rents to government -approved low-income tenants." The result <br />"eviscerated the Owners' right to exclude" which is "`one of the most essential sticks in the <br />bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' (Quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United <br />States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979)). The Court found a taking because: <br />... the statutes authorize the continuing physical occupation of particular <br />developers' properties to address a societal shortage of low-income housing and <br />that this is intrusive beyond the level of traditional governmental limits on land <br />titles. Under Penn Central, "[a] `taking may more readily be found when the <br />interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by the <br />government ... than when interference arises from some public program adjusting <br />the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." <br />438 U.S. at 124. <br />The city of Santa Ana may well wish to serve a public purpose of helping provide <br />affordable housing by not requiring old-fashioned and passe rent control. But the question to be <br />addressed is whether that burden can be imposed on Park owners without causing a <br />compensable taking by disallowing re -indexing to market at the end of the incumbent tenant's <br />residency. Such a practice is a slap to affordable housing, and a nod to profiteering by a seller <br />for whom the city has no further housing interest to protect. <br />The sale of mobilehomes which include the underlying leasehold property value is no <br />different than the illegal key money from improved premises in other states, where the practice is <br />illegal. Selling rent control entitlements at value is no different from "key money,i16 or "side <br />" Carl Mason and John M. Quigley (2006), The Curious Institution of Mobile Home Rent <br />Control: An Analysis of Mobile Home Parks in California. UC Berkeley: Berkeley Program on <br />Housing and Urban Policy. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/44d7h9hs. <br />-41- <br />