Correspondence - #33 - Laserfiche WebLink

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DOWDALL LAW OFFICES A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ATTO R N EYS AT LAW City Council of the City of Santa Ana City of Santa Ana September 16, 2021 Page 51 The Court specifically held that the demand for a bike pathway was unconstitutional for several reasons. The city's dedication requirements constitute an uncompensated taking of property, because under the well -settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit. In evaluating Dolan's claim, the constitutional test first requires that it be determined whether an "essential nexus" exists between a legitimate state interest and the permit condition. If one does, then it must be decided whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of the proposed development. 107 S.Ct. at 3147. The findings upon which the city relied did not show the required nexus between the floodplain easement and Dolan's proposed building?$ The Court held that the demanded exaction was not related to the intended use of the property. In our case, there is no use of the future property which would bear any connection (nexus) to the displacement of the former tenants. To put the tenants in a better position than if they voluntarily vacated is to impose a burden which cannot be countenanced under the Fifth Amendment, because the cost to the park owner results in a windfall to the tenant, and exceeds the cost for relocation of the mobilehome to another space.21 enhancing the public's ability to "traverse to and along the shorefront" served the same governmental purpose of "visual access to the ocean" from the roadway was beyond our ability to countenance. The absence of a nexus left the Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an easement through gimmickry, which converted a valid regulation of land use into "an out-and-out plan of extortion." Ibid., quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584,432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981). " "The Community Development Code already required that Dolan leave 15% of her property as open space, and the undeveloped floodplain would have nearly satisfied that requirement. However, the city has never said why a public, as opposed to a private, greenway is required in the interest of flood control. The difference to Dolan is the loss of her ability to exclude others from her property, yet the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of its request. The city has also not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by Dolan's development reasonably relates to the city's requirement for a dedication of the pathway easement. The city must quantify its finding beyond a conclusory statement that the dedication could offset some of the traffic demand generated by the development." 29 The Court stated in this regard: "Under the well -settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right --here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use --in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit. See Perry v. Sindermarm 408 U.S. 593,92 S.Ct. 2694,33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)." -51-