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28. The Parties understand that this MOU does not alter applicable state and federal law <br />that might govern any claim of civil liability arising out of their participation in the CITF. <br />a. COMMON LAW TORT CLAIMS <br />i. Congress has provided that the exclusive remedy for the negligent or wrongful act or <br />omission of an employee of the U.S. Government, acting within the scope of his or her <br />employment, shall be an action against the United States under the Federal Tort <br />Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and §§ 2671-2680. <br />ii. Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this MOU, for the limited purpose of <br />defending civil claims arising out of CITF activity, any employee detailed from a <br />Participating Agency who is acting within the course and scope of his or her official <br />duties and assignments pursuant to this MOU may be considered an "employee" of the <br />U.S. government, as defined at 28 U.S.C. § 2671. See 5 U.S.C. § 3374(c)(2). <br />iii. Under the Federal Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1998 <br />(commonly known as the Westfall Act), see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), if an employee of <br />the United States is named as a defendant in a civil action, the Attorney General or his <br />or her designee may certify that the defendant acted within the scope of his or her <br />employment at the time of the incident giving rise to the suit. 28 U.S.C. § <br />2679(d)(1)&(2). The United States can then be substituted for the employee as the <br />sole defendant with respect to any tort claims alleged in the action. 28 U.S.C. § <br />2679(d)(1)&(2). Decisions to certify that an employee was acting within the scope of <br />his or her employment at the time of the incident giving rise to the suit, see 28 U.S.C. § <br />2679(d)(1)&(2), are made on a case -by case -basis, and such certification cannot be <br />guaranteed. <br />iv. If the Attorney General declines to certify that an employee was acting within the <br />scope of employment, "the employee may at any time before trial petition the court to <br />find and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or <br />employment." 28 U.S. C. § 2679(d)(3). <br />b. INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY CLAIMS UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION OR FEDERAL <br />STATUTES <br />i. Liability for violations of the U.S. Constitution may rest with the individual agent or officer <br />acting under color of federal law pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of <br />the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) or pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 <br />for officers acting under color of state law. Other federal statutes may also allow for <br />individual capacity claims against agents or officers acting under color of law. <br />ii. Federal, state, local, and tribal officers enjoy qualified immunity from suit for alleged <br />violations of the U.S. Constitution and most federal statutes that create an express or <br />implied cause of action for damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly <br />established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have <br />known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). <br />FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY <br />This document is the property or the FBI and the Cm <br />Neither it nor its contents my be released without authorisation In, the FBI and the City <br />