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se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 8 of 18 Page ID #187 <br />1 MW remains "subject to potential fines, injunctions, and criminal prosecution" from the <br />2 City. Id. ¶31; see also id. ¶11 <br />3 On January 30, 2023, MW filed this suit, alleging inter alia that the City's actions <br />4 violated RLUIPA by imposing a substantial burden on its religious exercise. Compl. <br />5 �1116-27. On March 22, 2023, the City moved to dismiss MW's claims. Mot. at 2. <br />6 Specifically, the City argues that MW's "use of its property, as alleged in the Complaint, <br />7 does not constitute a religious exercise under RLUIPA," and that its denial of MW's <br />8 COO application does not impose a substantial burden on MW's religious exercise <br />9 because food and drink distribution is merely "incidental" to MW's practices. Id. <br />10 III. ARGUMENT <br />11 RLUIPA provides that "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use <br />12 regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a <br />13 person, including a religious assembly or institution" unless the government <br />14 demonstrates that the imposition of that burden is the least restrictive means of furthering <br />15 a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). Here, MW has plausibly <br />16 alleged a violation of RLUIPA because its Complaint asserts that (1) providing food and <br />17 drink to homeless individuals is a part of its "religious exercise," and (2) the City's <br />18 outright ban on this practice "imposes a substantial burden on its religious exercise." <br />19 A. MW plausibly alleged that its distribution of food and drinks to <br />20 homeless individuals is "religious exercise" under RLUIPA. <br />21 RLUIPA broadly defines "religious exercise" as "any exercise of religion, whether <br />22 or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000ce- <br />23 5(7)(A). This definition is deliberately far-reaching, as evidenced by Congress' intent to <br />24 distinguish RLUIPA "from traditional First Amendment jurisprudence" by "expand[ing] <br />25 the reach of the protection to include `any religious exercise."' Greene v. Solano Cnty. <br />26 Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 <br />27 (2005)). Indeed, RLUIPA itself demands that it be "construed in favor of a broad <br />28 protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this <br />7 <br />