?lection" and "special election", and does not make provisions or give
<br /> a definition of "regular election". Political Code, Section 1041, de-
<br /> fines a "general election" as follows: "There must be held throughout
<br /> the state, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, in
<br /> the year eighteen hundred and eighty, and in every second year thereaf-
<br /> ter, an election, to be known as the general election."
<br /> And gives the definition of "special election" as follows:
<br /> "Special elections are such as are held to supply vacancies in any
<br /> office, and are held at such times as may be designated by the proper
<br /> board or officer."
<br /> However, our Supreme Court has had occasion in the case of
<br /> People vs. Lynch, 114 California Reports, at Page 168, to cite several
<br /> authorities from out of state cases, defining the term "regular election
<br /> A Kansas case is cited and quoted as follows: "The words, 'regular
<br /> election' do not necessarily mean general election or township election,
<br /> or any state, county city or district election. They simply mean the
<br /> regular election prescribed by law for the election of the particular
<br /> officer to be elected."
<br /> In citing a Florida case, the following quotation is given;
<br /> "When it is declared that the city council shall fill vacancies until
<br /> the next regular election, it means until the next regular election pro-
<br /> vided by the charter for electing the officer whose term has been vacant
<br /> The nearest case we have in California which might decide this
<br /> question as to the meaning of the term "regular election" is found in
<br /> the case of People vs. Babcock, in 123 California Reports, at page 307,
<br /> in which our Supreme Court construed the term "regular election" under
<br /> an Act of the City and County of San Francisco referring to the appoint-
<br /> merit of the Superintendant of Schools by the Board of Education to fill
<br /> a vacancy. In filling this vacancy, the Board of Education specified,
<br /> "to fill the vacancy until the regular election then next following."
<br /> In this particular case the next regular election was a general
<br /> state election and also a general municipal election, and the proclama-
<br /> tion for the municipal election included the office of superintendant of
<br /> schools. In affirming this election for superintendant of schools and
<br /> in their opinion, the Supreme Court states: "In the case of any parti-
<br /> cular statute the construction can be determined Only by considering
<br /> the context in which the word is found, the purpose of the statute and
<br /> the object which it was designed to accomplish. The next regular elec-
<br /> tion may mean the election at which officers are to be regularly elected
<br /> or "regular" may be used merely to exclude special elections, or it may
<br /> be used synonimously or inter-changeably with the word "general".
<br /> They further make a quotation of the particular section under
<br /> discussion and state as follows: "If regular election is here to be
<br />construed as the election at which this class of officers is regularly
<br />- chosen~ then in cases of some officers contemplated by the cDmrter, the
<br /> regular election could only be at the end of the term and the provision
<br /> that a person shall be elected to serve for the remainder of the unex-
<br /> pired term would be meaningless. These instances are given not as hav-
<br /> ing any dstemzinative force upon the question here presented, but in
<br /> illustration of the fact that the p~hrase 'regular election' has no
<br /> fixed and inflexible meaning."
<br /> This decision was rendered in 1899, at which time general
<br /> municipal elections for members of the Board of Trustees were held
<br /> every two years. In other words, the terms were staggered~ Section
<br /> 754.of tD~ Act at this time could not be mis-interpreted and the inten-
<br /> tion of the Legislature was clear by reason of the fact that a general
<br /> municipal election was held ~very two years. In.1903, Section 752 of
<br /> the Act was amended so that after 1907, the staggered system was abol-
<br /> ished and we now have the Board of Trustees all elected every four years
<br /> Therefore, the force and effect of Section 754 was taken away and an
<br /> app~ntee would hold office until the next general municipal election.
<br /> This in view of the fact that Section 752 then specified and now speci-
<br /> fys that the Board of Trustees shall be elected at a GENERAL MUNICIPAL
<br /> ELECTION.
<br /> The o~ly construction, therefore, that can now be placed upon
<br /> Section 784 as t~ the term "regular election" is that it means the next
<br /> general municipal election as it meant previous to the amendment.
<br /> The Supreme Court in conclusion of their opinion in the case
<br /> of People vs. Babcock, state as follows: "'Regular election, as thus
<br /> employed, then, is synonimous with 'general election'. Whether it be a
<br /> general state election or a general municipal election~ it is unneces-
<br /> sary here to determine, since the election at which the relator was
<br /> elected was both a general State election and a general municipal
<br /> election".
<br /> From the foregoing decisions, the writer has come to the con-
<br /> clusion that "regular election" as used in Section 754 of Act 8233 can
<br /> only be given the meaning intended by the Legislature at the time the
<br /> Act was passed, and means the next general municipal election occuring
<br /> in April, 1938.
<br />
<br />Yours very truly,
<br />
<br />(Signed) 0. A. Jacobs
<br />
<br />On motion of Trustee Penn, seconded by Bruns and carried, the City
<br />
<br /> Council adJourned.
<br />
<br />APPROVED:
<br />
<br />l~or of t~e City 6f Santa Aha.
<br />
<br />City ~le~k.
<br />
<br />
<br />
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