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individuals, we find that the effects are always positive and strongest in those areas which <br />experienced the most rent appreciation between 1990 and 2000, as one might expect. For <br />older, high turnover households, however, the results are quite different. For this subgroup, <br />the effects are actually negative in the areas which experienced the highest rent appreciation. <br />They are positive in the areas which experienced below median rent appreciation.1' <br />This result suggests that landlords are likely actively trying to remove tenants in those <br />areas where rent control is affording the most benefits, i.e. high rent appreciation areas. <br />There are a few ways a landlord could accomplish this. First, landlords could try to legally <br />evict their tenants by, for example, moving into the properties themselves, known as owner <br />move -in eviction. Alternatively, landlords could evict tenants according to the provisions of <br />the Ellis Act, which allows evictions when an owner wants to remove units from the rental <br />market - for instance, in order to convert the units into condos or a tenancy in common. <br />Finally, landlords are legally allowed to negotiate with tenants over a monetary transfer <br />convincing them to leave. Such transfers are, in fact, quite prevalent in San Francisco. <br />Moreover, it is likely that those individuals who have not lived in the neighborhood long, <br />and thus not developed an attachment to the area, could be more readily convinced to <br />accept such payments or are worse at fighting eviction. Indeed, since landlord can evict <br />or pay tenants to move out, rent control need not inefficiently distort renters' decisions to <br />remain in their rent controlled apartments. Tenants may "bring their rent control with <br />them" in the form of a lump sum tenant buyout. Of course, if landlords predominantly <br />use evictions, tenants are not compensated for their loss of rent protection, weakening the <br />insurance value of rent control. <br />These considerations help to rationalize some additional, final findings. In Figure 7 and <br />Figure S, we examine the impact that rent control has on the types of neighborhoods tenants <br />live in in a given year. We find that treated individuals, i.e. those who received rent control, <br />ultimately live in census tracts with lower house prices, lower median incomes, and lower <br />1OA similar pattern holds for younger individuals as well, although the results are weaker. <br />15 <br />