Correspondence - #33 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

DOWDALL LAW OFFICES A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ATTO R N EYS AT LAW City Council of the City of Santa Ana City of Santa Ana September 16, 2021 Page 46 The reason that relocation allowances of a significant nature violate the constitutional rights of the property owner is because the value of the property is misdirected into the hands of departing landless tenants who had no other interest than mere tenancy. Awarding the tantamount of equity value through the labeling of dislocation assistance constitutes no different than the forced purchase of in -place mobile homes at market value based upon the fantasy that the park would continue, when in fact it will not. These fanciful legislative schemes devised in order to transfer wealth to residents does not take account of whether the park owner obligated to pay in -place value is also entitled to own and utilize the mobile home; and the law does not clarify how the state law is to be interpreted. The city stands in the an envious position then, of perhaps being one of the first to defend the state of California based upon its unusually and uniquely generous foray into the enrichment of the public with in -place values (AB 2782). It will not withstand constitutional muster. While the poor may constitute worthy legislative objectives to promote health safety and welfare, however, that enrichment cannot be extracted nor impressed upon private property owners seeking to simply recover their land and use it for some other purpose which, if not suitable to the local government, will never be approved in any case. In other words, by definition, a closure means that there will be a use approved and perhaps encouraged by local government that will promote a better and higher utility for the common good than the mobile home park left behind. Of course, the city could avoid this potential implied indemnification of the state of California by bifurcating this ordinance into two separate objectives to independently consider and judge. Assistance to the tenant in the form of payment for relocation of the residents may not be construed to require that the park owner pay for the sited value of the mobilehome (which is the same as paying twice for the park, because sited value often exists largely due to placement value caused by rent levels less than general market conditions). The proposed ordinance, as is, would have the effect of placing this economic plight exclusively on the shoulder of the park owner - to guarantee the investment by making good on residents' bad loans. Under this scenario, the park owner faces a "Hobson's Choice": pay the tenant for the inflated value of the mobilehome (if the economy were strong); pay the tenant for the loan value of the mobilehome (if the mobilehome cannot be sold for even loan value). In either case, the park owner's rights to be accountable exclusively for relocation costs is vitiated. Clearly, the requirement of relocation assistance in the form of payment for the mobilehome, which then allows the tenant to move the home elsewhere and sell it again, allows the tenant to obtain a double return on the mobilehome if this is the manner in which the city intends to construe this provision. This windfall is at the cost of the park owner and is constitutionally indefensible. Several cases have addressed these requirements. In California, one of the earliest cases to reach the courts based upon relocation requirements was Donald Rooke, et al., v. City of