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DOWDALL LAW OFFICES <br />A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION <br />ATTO R N EYS AT LAW <br />City Council of the City of Santa Ana <br />City of Santa Ana <br />September 16, 2021 <br />Page 49 <br />Even apart from the economic impact of a regulation, a taking may be found if a <br />restriction on land use does not "substantially advance legitimate state interests." <br />(Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 262.) "Where the conditions imposed are <br />not related to the use being made of the property but are imposed because the <br />entity conceives a means of shifting the burden of providing the cost of a public <br />benefit to another not responsible for or only remotely or speculatively benefitting <br />from it, there is an unreasonable exercise of the police power." (Liberty v. <br />California Coastal Com. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 491, 502.) <br />The Nollan case follows from this authority. <br />The Supreme Court recently refined this aspect of the takings analysis, suggesting <br />that closer scrutiny of the relationship between the condition imposed and the <br />public benefit is required.(Nollan v. California Coastal Com'n supra107 S.Ct. at <br />p. 3148.) In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission granted the Nollans a <br />permit to rebuild their beach house, but on the condition that they dedicate a <br />public right-of-way along the beach in front of their property. The Nollans <br />claimed that the imposition of this condition violated their Fifth Amendment <br />rights. The California Court of Appeal upheld the condition on grounds that it <br />bore a sufficient relationship to the burdens created by the project and, while the <br />value of the Nollans' property concededly would be diminished by the <br />right-of-way, they were not deprived of all reasonable use of their property. <br />However notes the Court, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the regulation was <br />impermissible. <br />When examined in the light of the Nollan decision, section 17.49.060(c) of the <br />conversion ordinance does not pass constitutional muster. A provision requiring <br />park owners to cash out their tenants at a price based in part on the value of <br />the underlying land, does not "substantially advance" the City's stated goals <br />of preserving its stock of mobilehome spaces and ensuring the residents' <br />quiet enjoyment of their homes. To be sure, it provides a financial boon to the <br />residents who occupy the park which is closing. But it does not directly mitigate <br />the detrimental effects of conversion, namely loss of mobilehome park spaces and <br />displacement of tenants. Indirectly the ordinance may well accomplish the <br />intended result, since the confiscatory restrictions it places on any conversion of <br />mobilehome parks will doubtless ensure that the parks continue to operate as such <br />throughout the City. But if the City wishes to acquire land for that purpose, it <br />must use its eminent domain power and compensate the property owners. (Nollan <br />v. California Coastal Com'n, supra, 107 S.Ct. at p. 3150.) <br />The ordinance is therefore barred by the Fifth Amendment of the United States <br />Constitution. It requires the tenants be made whole, based on value of mobilehomes attributable <br />to being located on the property owner's land, in order for the park owner to use his property in <br />