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a) Time (before 1993 and after 1993); see Table 6a; b) Household income (high or low); see Table 6b; and c) Proportion of elderly residents (high or low); see Table 6c. Perhaps the most important result is shown in the lower panel of Table 6a. In every case, the coefficient on the categorical variable for a rigid rent control regime after 1993 is positive. In only one case, (San Bernardino county) is it not significant. The coefficient is the incremental annual rate of growth in percentage points in real prices attributable to rigid rent control. It ranges from a high of 1.94 percent (Riverside county) to a low of 0.21 percent (San Diego county)12. For the aggregate data set, the annual real growth rate in prices of mobile homes is 1.11 percentage points higher in communities with rigid rent control regimes after 1993. This amounts to a gain of as much as $4,000 after ten years. In the same years, the annual growth rate for the prices of coaches in flexible regimes is -0.19 percentage points lower than for coaches in the overall market. Or, aggregating the two effects, the rate of price increase of coaches in communities with rigid regimes is 1.3 percentage points higher than for coaches in flexible regimes after 1993. Before 1993, the results are mixed. For the aggregate data set, the annual real growth rate in prices of mobile homes is 0.57 percentage points lower in communities with rigid rent control regimes than in the market overall. But, in communities where there is a flexible rent control regime, the rate of price increase overall is 1.69 percentage points lower. That is, the rate of price increase in rigid regimes is 1.12 percentage points higher than in flexible regimes before 1993. In Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego counties the impact is positive and significant rather than negative. In Ventura county, it is positive and insignificant. In Santa Clara and San Bernardino counties, it is negative and significant and, in Riverside county, it is negative and insignificant. We believe that flexible rent control schemes (with vacancy decontrol) may cause landlords to mark to market more consistently than in markets where there is no rent control. This may lead to coach owners/buyers in these communities actually expecting to pay higher pad rents over time than would their counterparts in markets without rent control. The coaches in these communities would sell for less than their equivalent in uncontrolled markets. The results support this hypothesis. This is the first evidence of this somewhat counter -intuitive but reasonable result. In Table 6b, we present results where we segment the analysis according to household income. Our presumption is that the benefits of rent control may be 12 We do not include San Bernardino county where the coefficient is not statistically significant.