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more valuable to lower income households. With less discretionary income, low income households should be more willing than higher income households to pay for the future reduction in pad rental costs arising from mobile home park rent control. We find this to be the case. Again, if we look at the post 1993 results for communities with rigid rent control regimes, we find that for the aggregate market the growth rate in prices of rent controlled coaches in high income census tracts was 0.92 percentage points higher than the overall market. We also find that for low income census tracts, the growth rate in the prices of rent -controlled coaches was 1.32 percentage points higher than the overall market (0.40 percentage points higher than for high income census tracts). Before 1993, for low-income households the rate of price increase for coaches in rigid rent controlled regimes experiences a positive and significant increment in four of the seven counties while for the overall data set, the result is negative and significant. This result perhaps reinforces the heterogeneity among the counties included in our sample as reflected by median household incomes reported in Table 4. The results for high- and low-income households before and after 1993 in flexible rent control regimes are mixed but dominated by negative impacts on the rate of increase in coach prices. This further supports the notion that coach owners/buyers seem to expect landlords to mark -to -market at the time a vacancy occurs. While we don't have evidence of this, it may be that rent control regimes that allow for vacancy decontrol also permit periodic increases that are greater than in more rigid regimes. We use vacancy decontrol as a general indicator of the rigidity of a local ordinance and local enforcement practices. Any rent control ordinance will have a number of components, among them a mechanism to determine the new pad rent when a unit is vacated and sold and a mechanism to determine the annual allowable adjustment for resident tenants. The latter is usually specified or tied to a price index such as the Consumer Price Index. In Table 6c, we show results where we segment the analysis according to the proportion of elderly in the census tract. Our presumption is that the benefits of rent control may be more valuable to younger households. With a longer expected tenancy as a consequence of their age we would expect younger households to attach a higher value to the expected annual savings arising from rent control. Younger households should discount this saving over a much longer time period while older households might reasonably expect the duration of their occupancy to be relatively short as they enter and move through retirement years_ We find this to be the case. Again, if we look at the post-1993 results for communities with rigid