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value on the benefit, as revealed by their migration patterns. However, landlords of proper- <br />ties impacted by the law change respond over the long term by substituting to other types <br />of real estate, in particular by converting to condos and redeveloping buildings so as to ex- <br />empt them from rent control. This substitution toward owner occupied and high-end new <br />construction rental housing likely fueled the gentrification of San Francisco, as these types <br />of properties cater to higher income individuals. <br />The 1994 San Francisco ballot initiative created rent control protections for small multi- <br />family housing built prior to 1980. This led to quasi -experimental rent control expansion in <br />1994 based on whether the multifamily housing was built prior to or post 1980. To examine <br />rent control's effects on tenant migration and neighborhood choices, we make use of new <br />panel data sources which provide the address -level migration decisions and housing charac- <br />teristics for close to the universe of adults living in San Francisco in the early 1990s. This <br />allows us to define our treatment group as renters who lived in small apartment buildings <br />built prior to 1980 and our control group as renters living in small multifamily housing built <br />between 1980 and 1990. Using our data, we can follow each of these groups over time up <br />until the present, regardless of where they migrate to. <br />On average, we find that in the medium to long term, the beneficiaries of rent control <br />are between 10 and 20 percent more likely to remain at their 1994 address relative to the <br />control group. These effects are significantly stronger among older households and among <br />households that have already spent a number of years at their treated address. This is <br />consistent with the fact both of these populations are less mobile in general, allowing them <br />to accrue greater insurance benefits. <br />On the other hand, for households with only a few years at their treated address, the <br />impact of rent control can be negative. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the impact is only <br />negative in census tracts which had the highest rate of ex -poste rent appreciation. This <br />evidence suggests that landlords actively try to remove their tenants in those areas where <br />the reward for resetting to market rents is greatest. In practice, landlords have a few possible <br />3 <br />