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ways of removing tenants. First, landlords could move into the property themselves, known <br />as move -in eviction. The Ellis Act also allow landlords to evict tenants if they intend to <br />remove the property from the rental market - for instance, in order to convert the units to <br />condos. Finally, landlords are legally allowed to offer their tenants monetary compensation <br />for leaving. In practice, these transfer payments from landlords are quite common and can be <br />quite large. Moreover, consistent with the empirical evidence, it seems likely that landlords <br />would be most successful at removing tenants with the least built-up neighborhood capital, <br />i.e. those tenants who have not lived in the neighborhood for long. <br />To understand the reduced form impact of rent control on rental supply, we merge in <br />historical parcel history data from the SF Assessor's Office, which allows us to observe <br />parcel splits and condo conversions. We find that the owners of exogenously rent controlled <br />properties substitute toward other types of real estate that are not regulated by rent control. <br />In particular, we find that rent -controlled buildings were almost 10 percent more likely to <br />convert to a condo or a Tenancy in Common (TIC) than buildings in the control group, <br />representing a substantial reduction in the supply of rental housing. Consistent with these <br />findings, we moreover find that, compared to the control group, there is a 15 percent decline <br />in the number of renters living in these buildings and a 25 percent reduction in the number <br />of renters living in rent -controlled units, relative to 1994 levels. <br />In order to evaluate the welfare impacts of these reduced form effects, we construct and <br />estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of neighborhood choice. Motivated by our reduced <br />form evidence, we allow for household preferences to depend on neighborhood tenure and <br />age, and allow for monetary "buyouts" where landlords of rent -controlled properties can pay <br />their tenants to move out. The model features fixed moving costs and moving costs variable <br />with distance. A key contribution of the paper, relative to the existing dynamic discrete <br />choice literature, is to show how such models can be identified in a GMM framework using <br />quasi -experimental evidence. <br />We find that rent control offered large benefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 <br />4 <br />